

569

CONFIDENTIAL

INTELLIFAX 1

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~/CONTROL-U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. [] (b)(3)

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Yugoslavia

DATE DISTR. 29 August 1951

SUBJECT Cominform Activity Against Yugoslavia

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED []

REFERENCE COPY

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) (b)(1)
(b)(3)

DATE OF INFO. Current

DO NOT CIRCULATE

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1850, AS AMENDED, ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE []

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS PREVIOUSLY
DISTRIBUTED AS "CIA PRELIMINARY
FOR DISSEMINATION NUMBERED []

(b)(3)

1. Current overt Cominform activity within Yugoslavia is insignificant and only a few cases of a covert nature have been uncovered. It is difficult to determine whether this indicates limited activity or well covered operations.
2. [] the most important Cominformists were arrested in the first few days following the Cominform rift. Speedy arrests prevented the Cominformists from organizing into clandestine groups. Present Cominform sympathizers may show sentiments in closed circles but they are not believed to be generally active.
3. The present Cominform line stresses that Tito has abandoned the worker's movement and that the end of the regime is in sight with the aid of the USSR and the Satellites. Handwritten pamphlets have appeared in central Serbia praising Stalin and occasionally slogans appear on walls and house steps in Belgrade.
4. The Yugoslav Government suppresses information concerning sabotage. Arrests for swindling, embezzlement, and for non-performance of duty are frequent. It is difficult to determine whether directed sabotage is widespread or whether the deterioration of the state administration is the result of the incompetence of officials.
5. Belgrade interprets the Motolov Warsaw speech as an encouragement to Cominformists to continue their activity in Yugoslavia. However, the possibility of internal support for the overthrow of the Yugoslav regime in conjunction with the USSR is believed not to be great.
6. The increasing frontier incidents and threats from Moscow and her Satellites, and other cold war provocations, leads Belgrade to regard seriously the possibility of an armed attack. However, it is generally believed that the USSR desires a reassurance of Satellite reliability prior to the launching of an attack. Belgrade believes that the USSR is not presently convinced of such Satellite reliability.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Document No. 6		CONFIDENTIAL	
CLASSIFICATION SECRET /CONTROL-U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY		DISTRIBUTION	
STATE	EX	RAW	FILED
ARMY	EX	DISSEMINATION	FBI
Class. Changed To: TS S C			
Auth.: HR 79-78			
Date: 7-29-78		By: []	

BY CABLE